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Abstract 
In this paper some initial work towards a new 
approach to qualitative reasoning under un­
certainty is presented. This method is not 
only applicable to qualitative probabilistic 
reasoning, as is the case with other methods, 
but also allows the qualitative propagation 
within networks of values based upon possi­
bility theory and Dempster-Shafer evidence 
theory. The method is applied to two simple 
networks from which a large class of directed 
graphs may be constructed. The results of 
this analysis are used to compare the quali­
tative behaviour of the three major quantita­
tive uncertainty handling formalisms, and to 
demonstrate that the qualitative integration 
of the formalisms is possible under certain as­
sumptions. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years, the use of reasoning about qual­
itative changes in probability to deal with uncertainty 
has become widely accepted, being applied to domains 
such as planning [Wellman 1990b] and generating plau­
sible explanations [Henrion and Druzdzel 1990]. Such 
a qualitative approach has certain advantages over 
quantitative methods, not least among which is the 
ability to model domains in which the relation between 
variables is uncertain as a result of incomplete knowl­
edge, and domains in which numerical representations 
are inappropriate. 
The existence of the latter, as Wellman [1990a] points 
out, is often due to the precision of numerical methods 
which can, in certain circumstances, lead to knowledge 
bases being applicable only in very narrow areas be­
cause of the interaction between values at a fine level 
of detail. Since they view the world at a higher level of 
abstraction, qualitative methods are immune to such 
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problems; the small complications such interactions 
cause simply have no effect at the coarse level of detail 
with which qualitative methods are concerned. 
The focus of the qualitative approach of Wellman and 
Henrion and Druzdzel is assessing the impact of evi­
dence. That is assessing how the change in probabil­
ity of one event due to some piece of evidence affects 
the probability of other events. For instance, taking 
a patient's temperature and finding that it is 38C is 
evidence that increases the probability that she has a 
fever, which in turn increases the probability that she 
has measles. 
Now, when using the qualitative method we reason 
with a restricted set of values. Instead of using the full 
range of real numbers we are only interested in whether 
values are positive [+], negative [-], zero [0], or any 
of the three [?]. Thus we can determine that since 
the probability of fever increases, the change in prob­
ability is [+], and use this to decide that the change 
in probability of measles is also [+]. This is clearly 
weaker information than that obtained by traditional 
methods but may still be useful [Wellman 1990a], in 
particular since qualitative results may be obtained in 
situations where no numerical information may be de­
duced. 
2 A NEW QUALITATIVE 
APPROACH 
This paper presents a new approach to reasoning about 
qualitative changes. This work is drawn from the first 
author's thesis [Parsons 1993] in which may be found 
a number of extensions to the work described here. 
The motivation behind this work was to integrate dif­
ferent approaches to reasoning under uncertainty, in 
particular probability, possibility [Zadeh 1978] [Dubois 
and Prade 1988a], and evidence [Shafer 1976] [Smets 
1988) theories. Thus, our qualitative approach differs 
from that described above in that it is concerned with 
changes in possibility values [Parsons 1992a] and belief 
values [Parsons 1992b) as well as probability values. As 
a result we need a general way of referring to values 
that may be probabilities, possibilities or beliefs. 
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Defini ti on 2.1: The certainty value of a variable X 
taking value x, val(x), is either the probability of X, 
p( x), the possibility of X, II( x), or the belief in X, 
bel(x). 
We set our work in the framework of singly connected 
networks in which the nodes represent variables of in­
terest, and the edges represent explicit dependencies 
between the variables. When the edges, of such graphs 
are quantified with conditional probability values they 
are similar to those studied by Pearl [1988], when pos­
sibility values are used the graphs are similar to those 
of Fonck and Straszecka [1991J and when belief values 
are used the graphs are those studied by Smets [1991J . 
Each node in a graph represents a binary valued vari­
able. The probability values associated with a vari­
able X which has possible values x and •X are p(x) 
and p( •x), and the possibility values associated with 
X are II(x) and II(•x). Belief values may be assigned 
to any subset of the values of X, so it is possible to 
have up to three beliefs associated with X; bel({x}), 
bel({•x}) and bel({x,•x}). For simplicity these will 
be written as bel(x), bel(•x) and bel(x U •x). This 
rather restrictive framework is loosened in [Parsons 
1993J where non-binary values and multiply connected 
are considered. 
Wellman [1990a, 1990bJ and Henrion and Druzdzel 
[1990J base their work upon the premise that a suitable 
interpretation of "a positively influences c" is that: 
p( c I a) :2: p( c I •a) (1) 
This seems reasonable, but it is a premise; there are 
other ways of encoding the information that seem 
equally intuitively acceptable, for instance p( c I a) > 
p(c) and p(c I a) > p(•c I a) [Dubois and Prade 1991J. 
Since our aim was to provide a method that was suit­
able for integrating formalisms we wanted to start from 
first principles thus minimising the number of neces­
sary assumptions. As a result, a different approach 
was adopted as described below. 
Given a link joining nodes A and C as in Figure 1, 
we are interested in the way in which a change in the 
value of a, say, expressed in a particular formalism, in­
fluences the value of c. Note that the arrow between A 
and C does not necessarily indicate a causal relation­
ship between them, rather it suggests that propagation 
of qualitative changes will be from A to C. 
0---·0 
A c 
Figure 1: A simple network 
We can then model the impact of evidence that affects 
the value of A in terms of the change in certainty value 
of a and •a, relative to their value before the evidence 
was known, and use knowledge about the way that 
a change in, say, val(a) affects val(c) to propagate 
the effect of the evidence. We define the following 
relationships that describe how the value of a variable 
X changes when the value of a variable Y is altered 
by new evidence: 
Defini ti on 2.2: The certainty value of a variable X 
taking value x is said to follow the certainty value 
of variable Y taking value y, val(x) follows val(y), 
if val(x) increases when val(y) increases, and val(x) 
decreases when val(y) decreases. 
Defini ti on 2.3: The certainty value of a variable X 
taking value x is said to vary inversely with the cer­
tainty value of variable Y taking value y, val(x) varies 
inversely with val(y), if val(x) decreases when val(y) 
increases, and val(x) increases when val(y) decreases. 
Defini ti on 2.4: The certainty value of a variable X 
taking value x is said to be independent of the cer­
tainty value of variable Y taking value y, val(x) is 
independent of val(y), if val(x) does not change as 
val(y) increases and decreases. 
The way in which the variation of val(x) with val(y) 
is determined is by establishing the qualitative value 
of the derivative 8val(x)\8val(y) that relates them. If 
the derivative is known, it is a simple matter to cal­
culate the change in val(x) from the change in val(y). 
Thus to determine the change at C in Figure 1 we 
have: 
[8val(c) ] 6-val(c) = 6-val(a) 0 Bval(a) 
[ 
8val(c) ] 
EB 6-val(•a) 0 Bval(•a) 
6-val(•c) = 6-val(a) 0 [ a;va�i0;)] 
[ 8val( •c) ] 
EB 6-val(•a) 0 Bval(•a) 
(2a) 
(2b) 
where [xJ is [+ J if x is positive, [OJ if x is zero and [-J if 
x is negative, and EB and 0 denote qualitative addition 
and multiplication respectively: 
EB [+J [OJ [-J [?J 
[+J [+J [+J [?J [?J 
[OJ [+J [OJ [-J [?J 
[-J [?J [-J [-J [?J 
[?J [?J [?J [?J [?J 
0 [+J [OJ [-J [?J 
[+J [+J [OJ [-J [?J 
[OJ [OJ [OJ [OJ [OJ 
[-J [-J [OJ [+J [?J 
(?J (?J [OJ [?J (?J 
We can express this as a matrix calculation (after Far-
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reny and Prade [1989]) : 
(3) 
0 [ D..val(a) ] D..val(-.a) 
Clearly val(c) follows val(a) when 8val(c)\8val(a) = 
[+], val(c) varies inversely with val(a) when 
8val(c)\8val(a) = [-] and is independent of val(a) 
when 8val(c)\8val(a) = [0]. 
3 QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN 
SIMPLE NETWORKS 
Applying probability theory to the example of Figure 
1, so that val(x) becomes p(x) in (2) and (3), and re­
ferring to the directed link joining A and C as A --+  C, 
we have the following simple result which agrees with 
the assumption (1) made by Wellman as a basis for 
his qualitative probabilistic networks when conditional 
values are taken as constant, as they are throughout 
this work: 
Theorem 3.1: The relation between p(x) and p(y) 
for the link A --+ C is such that p( x) follows p(y) iff 
p( x I y) > p( x I -.y), p( x) varies inversely with p(y) 
iff p(x I y) < p(x I -.y) and p(x) is independent of 
p(y) iff p(x I y) = p(x I -.y) for all for all x E {c, -.c}, 
yE{a,-.a}. 
Proof: Probability theory tells us that p( c) = p( a) 
p(c I a) + p(-.a)p(c I -.a) and p(a) = 1- p(-.a) so 
that p(c) = p(a)[p(c I a) - p(c I -.a)] + p(cl-.a) and 
[8val(c)\8val(a)J = [p(cla)- p(cl-.a)J. Similar rea­
soning about the way that p(c) varies with p(-.a) and 
p(-.c) varies with p(a) and p(-.a) gives the result. D 
By convention [Pearl1988J two nodes A and C are not 
connected in a probabilistic network if p( a I c) = p( a I 
-.c) . In addition, since p( a) and p( -.a) are related by 
p(a) = 1 - p(-.a), we can say that if p(c) follows p(a), 
then p( -.c) varies inversely with p( a) and follows p( -.a). 
The assumption that conditional probabilities are con­
stant does not seem to cause problems when propagat­
ing changes in singly connected networks as discussed 
here. However, the assumption does become problem­
atic when handling multiply connected networks [Par­
sons 1993]. 
Applying possibility theory to the network of Figure 
1, and writing II(x) for val(x) in (2) and (3), we can 
establish a relationship between II(a) and II(c). Un­
fortunately, unlike the analogous expression for prob­
ability theory, this involves the non-conditional value 
II( a). This complicates the situation since the exact 
form of the qualitative relationship between II( a) and 
II(c) depends upon whether II(a) is increasing or de­
creasing. '�'e have: 
Theorem 3.2: The relation between II(x) and II(y), 
for all x E {c,-.c}, y E {a,-.a}, for the link A --+  C is 
such that II(x) follows II(y) if min(II(x I y),II(y)) > 
min(II(x I -.y),II(-.y)) and II(y) < II(x I y). If 
min(II(x I y), II(y)) ::; min(II(x I -.y),II(-.y)) and 
II(y) < II(x I y) then II(x) may follow II(y) up if 
II(y) is increasing, and if min(II(x I y), II(y)) >min 
(II(x I -.y), II(-.y)) and II(y) � IT(x I y) then II(x) 
may follow II(y) down if II(y) is decreasing. Other­
wise II(x) is independent of II(y). 
Proof: Possibility theory gives II( c)= sup[min(II(c I 
a),II(a)),min('�r(c I -.a),II(-.a))]. This may not be 
differentiated, but consider how a small change in II( a) 
will affect II(c). If II(a) is the value that determines 
II( c), any change in II( a) will be reflected in II( c). This 
must happen when min(II(c I a),II(a)) > min(II(c I 
-.a),II(-.a)) and II(a) < II(c I a). If II(a) is increas­
ing and the second condition does not hold, it may 
become true at some point, and so the increase may 
be reflected in II (c). Similar reasoning may be applied 
when II( a) is decreasing and the first condition is ini­
tially false. Thus we can write down the conditions 
relating II(c) and II(a), while those relating II(c) and 
II(-.a) as well as those relating II(-.c) and II(a) and 
II( -.a) may be obtained the same way. D 
To formalise this we can say that [8val(c)\8val(a)] = 
[iJ if ii(x) may follow II(y) up and [8val(c)\8val(a)J = 
[!J if ii(x) may follow II(y) down while extending 0 to 
give: 
0 [+J [OJ [-J [?J [iJ [!] 
[+J [+J (OJ [-J [?J [+,OJ [OJ 
[OJ [OJ [OJ [OJ [OJ [OJ [OJ 
[-J [-J [OJ [+J [?J [OJ [-,OJ 
[?J [?J [OJ [?] [?J [+,0] [-,0] 
where [+,OJ indicates a value that is either zero or 
positive. Normalisation, the possibilistic equivalent of 
p(a) = 1-p(-.a), ensures that max(II(a), II(-.a)) = 1. 
Thus at least one of II( a) and II(-.a) is 1, and at most 
one of II(a) and II(-.a) may change, so II(x) changes 
when either II(y) or II(-.y) changes. 
Writing bel( x) for val( x) in (2) and (3), and using 
Dempster's rule of combination [Shafer 1976J to com­
bine beliefs in the network of Figure 1, we have: 
Theorem 3.3: The relation between bel(x) and bel(y) 
for the link A --+  C is such that bel(x) follows bel(y) 
iff bel(x I y) > bel(x I y U -.y), bel(x) varies inversely 
with bel(y) iff bel(x I y) < bel(x I y U -.y) and bel(x) 
is independent of bel(y) iff bel(x I y) = bel(x I y u-.y) 
for all x E {c,c}, y E {a, a}. 
Proof: By Dempster's rule bel( c)= La�{a,-,a} m(a) 
bel(c I a). Now, from Shafer [1976J m(a) = bel(a), 
m(-.a) = bel(-.a) and m(au-.a) = 1-bel(a)-bel(-.a). 
Thus 8bel(c)\8bel(a) = bel(c I a)-bel(c I aU-.a). Sim-
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ilar reasoning about the way that bel(c) varies with 
bel(•a) and bel(-.c) varies with bel(a) and bel(•a) 
gives the result. 0 
Note that bel( c) is the belief in hypothesis c given all 
the available evidence, while bel( c I aU •a) is the belief 
induced on c by the marginalisation on { c U -.c} of the 
joint belief on the space { c U •c} x {a U •a}. Thus 
bel( c) follows bel( a) if cis more likely to occur given a 
than given the whole frame. Other results are possible 
when alternative rules of combination, such as Smets' 
disjunctive rule [Smets 1991], are used. 
The results presented in this section allow the propa­
gation of changes in value from A to C given condi­
tionals of the form val(c I a). It is possible to derive 
similar results for propagation from C to A [Parsons 
1993] which say, for instance, that if p(c) follows p(a), 
then p( a) follows p( c). 
4 A COMPARISON OF THE 
THREE FORMALISMS 
It is instructive to compare the qualitative behaviours 
of the simple link of Figure 1 when the conditional 
values that determine its behaviour are expressed us­
ing probability, possibility and evidence theories. This 
comparison exposes the differences in approach taken 
by the qualitative formalisms, providing some basis for 
choosing between them as methods of knowledge rep­
resentation. 
One way of representing the possible behaviours that 
a link may encode, is to specify the possible values of 
�val(•a), �val(c) and �val(•c) for given values of 
�val( a). Thus for probability theory we have: 
p(a) = 1 If �p(a) =[OJ Then �p(•a) =[OJ 
If �p(a) = [-] Then �p(•a) = [+] 
p(a) f; 1 If �p(a) = [+] Then �p(•a) = [-] 
If �p( a) = [0] Then �p( •a) = [OJ 
If �p(a) = [-] Then �p(•a) = [+] 
For any value of p(a), either [8p(c)\8p(a)J = [+J, or 
[8p(c)\8p(a)] =[-],and: 
p(c) = 1 
p(c) f; 1 
If �p(c) = [0] 
If �p(c) = [-J 
If �p(c) = [+] 
If �p(c) = [0] 
If �p(c) = [-] 
Then �p(•c) = [0] 
Then �p(•c) = [+] 
Then �p(•c) = [-] 
Then �p(•c) = [0] 
Then �p(•c) = [+] 
The criterion on which the choice of probability theory 
is most likely to depend, is whether or not it is ap­
propriate that [8val(x)\8val(•x)] = [-] in every case 
since it is possible to model this in other formalisms, 
and impossible to avoid it in probability theory. 
In possibility theory we have: 
II(a) = 1 If �II(a) = [0] 
If �II(a) = [-] 
Then �II(•a) = [?] 
Then �II(•a) =[+,OJ 
II( a) f; 1 If �II( a)=[+] Then �ll(•a) = [0, -] 
If �II( a) = [0] Then �II( •a) = (0] 
If �II(a) = [-] Then �II(•a) = (0] 
For any II(a), either [8II(c)\8II(a)J [0] or 
[8II(c)\8II(a)] =[+]while: 
II(c) = 1 
II(c):ft1 
If �II(c) = (0] 
If �II(c) = [-] 
If �II(c) = [+] 
If �II( c) = [0] 
If �II( c)=[-] 
Then �II( •c) = [?] 
Then �II(•c) = [+, 0] 
Then �II(•c) = (0, -] 
Then �II( •c) = (OJ 
Then �II(•c) = [0] 
where �II(x) =[?]is taken to mean �II(x) = [+], [0] 
or [-]. Thus possibility theory can represent a wider 
range of behaviours than probability theory. 
However, possibility theory has one major limitation 
that is not shared by probability theory, and that is the 
fact that it does not have an inverting link. If val( a) 
increases, it is only possible to have val( c) decreasing if 
val(•a) decreases and val(c) follows it. This restricts 
the representation to the situation in which val( a) :ft 1 
and increases to 1 and this may be inappropriate. 
Evidence theory is the least restricted of the three. 
Here we have: 
bel(a) = 1 If �bel(a) = [0] Then �bel(•a) = [?] 
If �bel(a) = (-] Then �bel(•a) = (?] 
bel(a) :ft 1 If �bel(a) = [+] Then �bel(•a) = [?J 
If �bel(a) =[OJ Then �bel(•a) = [?J 
If �bel(a) = [-] Then �bel(•a) = [?] 
For any bel(a), [8bel(c)\8bel(a)J = [+], [0], or [-], 
while: 
bel(c) = 1 
bel(c) f; 1 
If �bel(c) = [0] 
If �bel(c) = [-J 
If �bel( c)=[+] 
If �bel(c) = [0] 
If �bel(c) = [-J 
Then �bel ( •c) = [?) 
Then �bel(•c) = [?J 
Then �bel(•c) = [?J 
Then �bel ( •c) = [?] 
Then �bel(•c) = [?J 
so that there are no restrictions on the changes. 
The purpose of this comparison is not to suggest that 
one formalism is the best in every situation. Instead, 
it is intended as some indication of which formalism is 
best for a particular situation. If a permissive formal­
ism is required, then evidence theory may be the best 
choice, while probability might be better when a more 
restrictive formalism is needed. 
5 QUALITATIVE CHA NGES IN 
MORE COMPLEX NETWORKS 
The analysis carried out in Section 3 allows us to pre­
dict how qualitative changes in certainty value will 
be propagated in a simple link between two nodes. 
Now, the change at C depends only on the change 
at A, and differential calculus tells us that 8z\8x = 
8z\8y · oy\ox so the behaviours of such links may 
be composed. Thus we can predict how qualitative 
changes are propagated in any network, quantified by 
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probabilities, possibilities or beliefs where every node 
has a single parent. 
D 
Figure 2: A more complex network 
We now extend these results to enable us to cope with 
networks in which nodes may have more than one par­
ent. To do this we consider the qualitative effect of 
two converging links such as those in Figure 2. Since 
we are only dealing with singly connected networks, B 
and C are independent and the overall effect at D is 
determined by: 
[ 
tl.val(d) 
] 
_ [ [ 
����: 
] 
[ :v
v
a�1 !b 
] ] 
tl.va/(-,d) - [ &val -,d ] [ &val -,d] 
&val b &val -,b 
0 [ tl.val(b) 
] 
(4) tl.val( -,b) 
[ [ �] [ &&vva�l !c ] l 
EB [a;:�� d 
] 
[ 
����  ] 
0 
[ 
!:����)] 
There are two ways of tackling the network of Figure 2 
in probability theory. We can either base our calcula­
tion on probabilities of the form p(d I b) which implies 
the simplifying assumption that the effect of B on D 
is independent of the effect of C (and vice versa), or 
we can use the proper joint probabilities of the three 
events B, C, and D, using values of the form p( d I b, c). 
In the first case we assume that the effects of B and 
C on D are completely independent of one another 
so that the variation of D with B (and D with C) is 
just as described by Theorem 3.1, the joint effect being 
established by using ( 4) to obtain: 
[tl.p(d)] = [ ����?] 0 [.6.p(b)] EB [:;�i)] 0 [6.p(-,b)] 
EB [����?] 0 [6.p(c)] EB [:;��)] 0 [6.p(-,c)] 
which gives the same results as the expression given 
by Wellman [1990a] for evaluating the same situa­
tion. vVith the other approach, writing the network 
as B&C ...... D, we have: 
Theorem 5.1: The relation between p(z) and p(x) 
for the link B&C ...... D is determined by: 
[ 
;=� ;�] 
= [p( z I X, y) + p( z I ""lX, -,y) 
- p(z I x, -,y)- p(z l..,x, y)J 
EB [p(z I x, -,y)- p(z 1-,x, -,y)] 
for all x E {b, -,b}, y{c, -,c} and z E {d, -,d}. 
Proof: We have p(d) = LbE{b,-,b}cE{c,-,c} p(b, c, d) = 
Lbe{b,-,b}cE{c,..,c} p(b, c)p(d I b, c). Since B and C are 
independent, p(b, c) = p(b)p(c). Using p(x) = 1 -
p(-,x) and differentiating we find that [8p(d)\8p(b)] = 
p(c) [p(d I b, c)-p(d I -,b, c)] +p(-,c) [p(d I b, -,c)-p(d I 
-,b,-,c)] = p(c){[p(d I b,c) + p(d I -,b,-,c)]- [(p(d I 
b, -,c)+ p(d I -,b, c)]}+ [(p(d I b, -,c)- p(d I ..,b, -,c)]. 
From this, and similar results for the variation of p( d) 
with p(-,b), p(c) and p(-,c), and the way p(-,d) changes 
with p( b), p( -,b), p( c) and p( -,c), the result follows. D 
Thus the way in which for instance p( d) is dependent 
upon p(b) is itself dependent upon a term just like the 
synergy condition introduced by Wellman, and apply­
ing ( 4) we get an expression which has a similar be­
haviour to that given by Wellman for a synergetic re­
lation. In possibility theory we have a similar result 
to that for the simple link: 
Theorem 5.2: The relation between II(x), IT(y) and 
II(z), for all x E {b,-,b}, y E {c,..,c}, z E {d,-,d} for 
the link B&C ...... D is such that: 
(1) II(z) follows II( x) iff II( x, y, z) > sup[II( ..,x, y, z), 
II(x,-.y,z),II(..,x,-,y,z)] and II(x) < min(II(z I x,y), 
II(y)), or II(x, -,y, z) > sup[II(x, y, z), II(..,x, y, z), 
II(-,x,..,y,z)] and II(x) < min(II(z I x,-,y),II(-,y)). 
(2) II(z) may follow II(x) up iff II(x, y, z) ::::; sup 
[IT(-.x,y,z),IT(x,-.y,z),II(..,x,..,y,z)] and II(x) < 
min(II(z I x, y), II(y)), or II(x, -.y, z) ::::; sup[II(x, y, 
z), II(-,x, y, z), II(-,x, -,y, z)] and II(x) < min(II(z I 
x, ..,y), II(-,y)). 
(3) II(z) may follow II(x) down iff II(x, y, z) > 
sup[II(-.x, y, z),II(x, -,y, z), II(-,x,-,y, z)] and II(x);::: 
min(IT(z I x, y), II(y)), or II(x, -,y, z) > sup[IT(x, y, 
z), II(-,x, y, z), II(-,x, -,y, z)] and II(x) 2': min(IT(z I 
x,-,y),II(-,y)). 
(4) Otherwise II(z) is independent of II(x). 
Proof: As for Theorem 3.2, the result may be de­
termined directly from IT(d) = SUPxe{x,..,x},YE{y,-,y} 
II(x,y,z) and II(x,y,z) = II(z I x,y)IT(x)II(y).D 
When we use belief values we may take the relationship 
between B, C and D to be determined by one set of 
conditional beliefs of the form bel(d \ b, c), or by two 
sets of conditional beliefs of the form bel( dlb). For 
conditionals of the form bel(d I b, c) we have: 
Theorem 5.3: The relation between bel(z) and bel(x) 
for the link B &C ...... D is determined by: 
[��::�:�] = [bel(z I x,y) - bel(z I x u-,x,y)] 
EB [bel(z I x, -,y)- bel(z I xU -,x, ..,y)] 
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EB [ bel(z I x, yU--,y)-bel(z I xU--,x, yU--,y)] 
For all x E {b,--,b}, y E {c,--,c}, z E {d,--,d}. 
Proof: By Dempster's rule of combination, bel(d) = 
Lb�{b,-.b},c�{c,-.c} m(b)m(c)bel(dib,c). Now, m(x) = 
bel(x), m(--,x) = bel(--,x) and m(x U --,x) = 1 -bel(x) 
-bel(--,x), so that [8bel(d)\8bel(b)] = [(bel(d I b, c)­
bel( d I b U --,b, c)] Ef) [(bel( d I b, -,c)-bel( d I b U --,b, -,c)] EB 
[(bel(d I b, cu--,c)-bel(d I bu--,b, cu--,c). From this, and 
similar results for the variation of bel( d) with bel(--,b), 
bel(c) and bel(--,c), and the way bel(--,d) changes with 
bel(b), bel( --,b), bel( c) and bel( --,c) the result follows. D 
Thus bel( d) follows bel(b) iff bel(d I b, c) > bel(d I 
bu--,b,c), bel(d I b,--,c) > bel(d I bu--,b,--,c), and bel(d I 
b, c U -,c) > bel(d I b U --,b, c U -,c). For conditionals of 
the form bel( d I b) we obtain: 
Theorem 5.4: For the link B&C--+ D, bel(z) follows 
bel(x) if bel(z I x) � bel(zixU--,x) and is indeterminate 
otherwise for all x E {b,--,b}, y E {c,--,c}, z E {d,--,d}. 
Proof : Dempster's rule of combination tells us 
that bel(d) = Lb�{b,-.b},c�{c,-.c},bvc:Jd bel(dib)m(b) 
bel( dic)m( c). As a result, [8bel( d)\8bel(b )] = [(bel( d I 
b)-bel( d I bu--,b )]{bel( di--,c) [ 1 +bel( c )+bel( --,c) -m( c)] 
+bel( di--,c) [ 1 +bel( c)+ bel( -,c)-m( -,c)] +bel( die) [ 1 + 
bel(c) + bel(--,c)- m(c U -,c)]}+ bel(dl--,b) [m(c)bel(d I 
c)+ m(--,c)bel(d I -,c)+ m(c U --,c)bel(dic U -,c)). Since 
m(x) :::; 1 for all x, [8bel(d)\8bel(b)] = [+] if bel(d I 
b) � bel(dlb U -,b) and [?) otherwise. From this, and 
similar results for the variation of bel( d) with bel(--,b), 
bel(c) and bel(--,c), and the way bel(--,d) changes with 
bel(b), bel(--,b), bel(c) and bel(--,c) the result follows. D 
Thus the formalisms again exhibit differences in be­
haviour across the same network. 
The expressions derived in this section are those ob­
tained by using the precise theory of each formalism. 
This is important since it ensures the correctness of 
the integration introduced in Section 6. However, for 
reasoning using single formalisms, it may provde ad­
vantageous to extend the simpler apporach adopted by 
Wellman [1990a) to possibility and evidence theories. 
Finally a word on the scope of the reasoning that we 
can perform as a result of our analysis. The differential 
calculus tells us that .6-z = Ax· [8z\8x] + .6-y · [8z\8y], 
provided that x is not a function of y. Thus we can 
clearly use the results derived above to propagate qual­
itative changes in probability, possibility and belief 
functions through any singly connected network. 
6 INTEGRATION THROUGH 
QUALITATIVE CHANGE 
The work described in this paper so far has extended 
qualitative reasoning about uncertainty handling for­
malisms to cover possibility and belief values as well 
as probability values. Not only is this useful in it­
self in providing a means of reasoning according to the 
precise rules of probability, possibility and Dempster­
Shafer theory when there is incomplete numerical in­
formation, but it can also provide a way of integrating 
the different formalisms. 
Consider the following medical example. The network 
of Figure 3 encodes the medical information that joint 
trauma (T) leads to loose knee bodies (K), and that 
these and arthritis (A) cause pain (P). The incidence 
of arthritis is influenced by dislocation (D) of the joint 
in question and by the patient suffering from Sjorgen 's 
syndrome (S) . Sjorgen's syndrome affects the inci­
dence of vasculitis (V), and vasculitis leads to vas­
culitic lesions (L). 
T 
Figure 3: A network representing medical knowledge 
The strengths of these influences are given as proba­
bilities: 
p(k I t) 0.6 p(v Is) 
p(k I --,t) 
p(a I d,s) 
p(a I d, --,s) 
0.2 p(v I --,s) 
0.9 p(a 1--,d, s) 
0.6 p(a I --,d, --,s) 
beliefs: 
bel(p I k, a) 
bel(p I k,--,a) 
bel(p I --,k, a) 
bel(p I k U --,k, a) 
bel(p I k, a U  -,a) 
bel ( --,p I --,k, -,a) 
bel( --,p I --,k, a U  -,a) 
= 0.9 
0.7 
= 0.7 
0.6 
0.7 
0.5 
0.4 
All other conditional beliefs are zero 
and possibilities: 
IT(l i v) 
II(-,/ I v) 
1 II(/ I --,v) 
0.1 II(--,/1--,v) 
1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.3 
0.6 
0.4 
We can integrate this information allowing us to say 
how our belief in the patient in question being in pain, 
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and the possibility that the patient has vasculitic le­
sions, vary when we have new evidence that she is 
suffering from Sjorgen's syndrome. From the new ev­
idence we have �p(s) = [+], �p(-.s) = [-] , �p(t) = 
[0], �p( -.t) = [0], �p( d) = [0] and �p( -.d) = [0]. Since 
a change of [0] can never become a change of [ +] or [ -] 
we can ignore the latter changes. Now, from Theorem 
3.1 and Theorem 5.1 we know that: 
[8p(v)] = 
[-] 
8p(s) 
[ 8p(v) ] = 
[+] 
8p(-.s) 
[8p(a)] 
= [+] 
[ 8p(a) ] 
= [-] 8p(s) 8p(-.s) 
so that �p(a) =[+], and �p(v) =[-] from which we 
can deduce that �p(-.a) =[-] and �p(-.v) = [+]. 
To continue our reasoning we need to establish the 
change in belief of a and the change in possibility of 
l. To do this we make the monotonicity assumption 
[Parsons 1993] that if the probability of a hypothesis 
increases then both the possibility of that hypothesis 
and the belief in it do not decrease. As well as being 
intuitively acceptable, this assumption is the weakest 
sensible relation between values expressed in different 
formalisms, and is compatible both with the principle 
of consistency between probability and possibility val­
ues laid down by Zadeh [1978] and the natural exten­
sion of this principle to belief, necessity [Dubois and 
Prade 1988b], and plausibility values. 
The assumption also says that if the probability de­
creases then the possibility and belief do not increase, 
and so we can say that �bel( a)= [+, OJ, �bel(-.a) = 
[-, 0], �II(v) = [-,0] and �II(-.v) = [+, 0]. Now we 
apply Theorem 5.3 to find that: 
[8bel(p)] = [+] [ 8bel(p) ] = [O] 
8bel(a) 8bel(-.a) 
[8bel(-.p)] 
= [-] 
[8bel(-.p)] 
= [+] 
8bel(a) 8be/(-.a) 
Since we are initially ignorant about the possibility of 
vasculitis, we have II(v) = II(-.v) = 1, so that Theo­
rem 3.2 gives: 
[ 8p(l)] 
= [0] 
[ 8p(l) ] 
= [0] 
8p( v) 8p( -.v) 
[8p(-.l)] 
=(OJ 
[8p(-.l)] 
=[OJ 
8p(v) 8p(-.v) 
Hence we can tell that �bel(p) = [+, 0], bel(-.p) 
[-, OJ and �II( v) = �II( -.v) = [OJ. The result of the 
new evidence is that belief in the patient's pain may in­
crease, while the possibility of the patient having vas­
culitic lesions is unaffected. Thus we can use numeri­
cal values and qualitative relationships from different 
uncertainty handling formalisms to reason about the 
change in the belief of some event given information 
about the probability of a second event, and can in­
fer whether the possibility of a third event also varies. 
As a result reasoning about qualitative change allows 
some integration between formalisms. 
7 DISCUSSION 
There is an important difference between the approach 
to qualitative reasoning under uncertainty described 
here, and that of Wellman [1990a, bJ. Despite their 
name, Wellman's Qualitative Probabilistic Networks 
do not describe the qualitative behaviour of probabilis­
tic networks exactly. In particular, some dependencies 
between variables are ignored in favour of simplicity, 
and synergy relations are sometimes introduced to rep­
resent them where it is considered to be important. 
In our approach, since it is based directly upon the 
various formalisms, the qualitative changes predicted 
are exactly those of the quantitative methods. This 
has been demonstrated in [Parsons and Saffiotti 1993J 
which analyses the representation of a real problem in 
a number of different qualitative and quantitative for­
malisms. In this analysis we make qualitative predic­
tions about the impact of evidence of faults in an elec­
tricity distribution network and compare these with 
the real quantitative changes. In every ca<;e, for proba­
bility, possibility and belief values, the qualitative pre­
dictions were correct. This verification is a good in­
dication of the validity of the approach, and suggests 
that it will be useful in situations where incomplete 
information prevents the application of quantitative 
methods. 
Our qualitative method also provides a means of in­
tegrating uncertainty handling formalisms on a purely 
syntactic basis. For any hypothesis x about which we 
have uncertain information expressed, say in proba­
bility theory and possibility theory, we can make the 
intuitively reasonable assumption that if p( x) increases 
II( x) does not decrease, and thus translate from proba­
bility to possibility without worrying what probability 
or possibility actually mean. 
As a result any desired semantics may be attached 
to the values, a feature which finesses the problem of 
the acceptability of the semantics which must be faced 
by other, semantically based, schemes for integration 
(eg. [Baldwin 1991]). The only problem with switch­
ing semantics would be that some combination rules 
might no longer apply, Dempster's rule in the case of 
Baldwin's voting model semantics, which would entail 
a re-derivation of the appropriate propagation condi­
tions. Since the qualitative approach does not a priori, 
rule out any combination scheme, this is not a major 
difficulty. 
Finally, there is one important way that this method 
might be improved. The main disadvantage of any 
qualitative system is that there is no distinction be­
tween small values and large values, so 0.001 is qualita­
tively the same as 100, 000. As a result we cannot dis­
tinguish between evidence that induces small changes 
in the certainty of a hypothesis and evidence that in­
duces large changes. This problem has been recognised 
for some time, and there is now a large body of work 
on order of magnitude reasoning (for example [Raiman 
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1986], [Parsons and Dohnal 1992]) which attempts to 
automate reasoning of the form it "If A is bigger than 
B and B is bigger than C then A is bigger than C". 
The applications to our system are obvious, and we 
intend to do some work on this in the near future. 
8 SUMMARY 
This paper has introduced a new method for qualita­
tive reasoning under uncertainty which is equally ap­
plicable to all uncertainty handling techniques. All 
that need be done to find the qualitative relation be­
tween two values is to write down the analytical ex­
pression relating them and take the derivative of this 
expression with respect to one of the values. This fact 
was illustrated by results from the qualitative analysis 
of the simplest possible reasoning networks in each of 
the three most widely used formalisms. 
Having established the qualitative behaviours of prob­
ability, possibility and evidence theories, the differ­
ences between these behaviours were discussed at some 
length, before knowledge of this behaviour was used to 
establish a form of qualitative integration between for­
malisms. In this integration numerical and qualitative 
data expressed in all three formalisms was used to help 
derive the change in belief of one node in a directed 
graph and the possibility of another from knowledge 
of a change in the probability of a third, related, node. 
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